User:Robertinventor/Debate about scientific value of Mars sample return and methods to avert low probability existential risks

This article was created, but then was deleted again as a result of an AfD. Am keeping this original here for references and future use elsewhere in wikipedia.

There is a later version of it here: User:Robertinventor/Concerns for an early Mars sample return backup

There are several proposals for a Mars sample return mission (MSR) to bring back to Earth rock and dust samples from Mars to study. It is currently unknown whether or not life forms exist on Mars. If such life exists, a MSR could potentially transfer viable organisms resulting in a risk of back contamination — the introduction of extraterrestrial organisms into Earth's biosphere.

There is general agreement in the literature on the subject that, though the potential for large-scale negative effects appears to be very low, it is not demonstrably zero, and that the samples should be treated as biohazardous to the environment of Earth until shown to be safe. As a result all are agreed that these are matters of concern and need to be dealt with in any mission plans. There is a diversity of views however on how these concerns should be met.

It is agreed that a full and open public debate of the back contamination issues is needed at an international level before any sample return. This is also a legal requirement.. .

Prevailing View
The prevailing view as shown in the official reports from the Space Studies Board and the European Space Foundation is as follows:

The more recent ESF report has reduced the particle size limits for the containment from the previous report due to their decision that it is necessary to contain virus-type and GTA-type entities:

The reports concluded that a safe sample return is possible provided due caution is taken to reduce any chance of escape of particles, and provided that the sample return mission is designed to break the chain of contact with Mars for the exterior of the sample container.

The reports also recommend that a new type of Mars Sample Receiving Facility needs to be made to handle the samples on return to Earth. It has to function as a clean room as well as a biohazard containment facility. This requires a novel design challenges since the standard designs for clean rooms and biohazard containment are inconsistent with each other. Clean rooms require positive air pressure to keep contaminents out, and biohazard facilities require negative air pressure to keep biohazards in. Several preliminary designs have been drawn up for this facility.

The NASA Office of Planetary Protection work with mission planners to ensure compliance with NASA policy and international agreements, and has issued recommendations to deal with these issues.

The current planetary protection office recommendation is that the facility should be operational at least two years prior to launch. Preliminary studies have warned that it may take as many as 7 to 10 years to get it operational.

The official reports stress the need for public debate at the international level due to the ethical issues involved.

The aim of this article is to present in detail some of the varying viewpoints on the risks and benefits of a Mars sample return, including minority views held by only one scientist or ethicist. These are all relevant to the international debate that will be required before a Mars Sample Return.

Plans to return a sample to Earth before detailed examination
All concerned agree that Mars samples are of high scientific value, and are most easily studied in Earth laboratories.

NASA have no immediate plans for a MSR, but have considered proposals to return a Mars sample direct to Earth, possibly in the 2030s, in its Mars Next Generation program. . . China also has considered a plan to return a sample by 2030.

Samples returned under these proposals would be examined for biosignatures on Mars first, but would not have any detailed examination such as with Scanning Electron Microscopes, DNA sequencers, or labelled culture experiments. Also they would not be tested for biohazard potential in Earth-like environments prior to return to Earth.

These plans depend on adequate containment of the samples during the return journey and in the receiving facility on Earth. The official studies have raised several concerns with this proposal and answered them with risk mitigation strategies. The prevailing view of most scientists and mission planners is that a sample return to Earth is both safe and desirable provided the recommended planetary protection precautions are taken.

There is general agreement in the published literature that we are not yet ready to receive a sample from Mars. . The prevailng view is that provided planning starts early enough, we can be sufficiently ready to receive a sample by the time the mission is launched.

Criticism of these plans, and alternative proposals
Some scientists in the ICAMSR, lead by Barry DiGreggorio are skeptical that adequate containment can be guaranteed when the samples are not yet understood, or are concerned about other issues such as human error breaking containment, potentially leading to back contamination   of Earth by accidentally released Martian micro-organisms.

Other scientists are critical of the science value of the mission. Jeffrey Bada has argued that it is hard to distinguish interesting from uninteresting samples for exobiology on a geological basis. The argument is that biological materials are easily degraded by surface conditions on Mars, particularly the UV radiation, and long term, by cosmic radiation. Without the ability to detect trace amounts of organics, and the ability to detect degradation of organics, he argues, there is a high chance of returning biologically uninteresting samples no more conclusive than the meteorite samples we already have from Mars.

Others who advocate a vigorous "in situ" study on the Mars surface in place of a MSR, on issues of science value, include astrobiologist Dirk Schulze-Makuch, and Robert Zubrin, president of the Mars society.

Others while not criticizing a MSR as such, see greater value in "in situ" studies. Craig Venter argues that it is impossible to totally prevent contamination by Earth life during the return journey, so reducing their value for scientific research. . Others argue that telerobotics provides a way to study samples on the surface of Mars without contamination issues, either way, while also eliminating problems due to loss of volatiles during the return journey to Earth.

Alternative proposals include in situ study using rovers with new instruments, telerobotic study on the Mars surface, and return of samples to the vicinity of the ISS for study, or to the vicinity of humans in Mars orbit.

Before a sample return, the public will need to be involved in a full and open debate about the mission for both legal and ethical reasons. This debate will need to take account of all the views on the matter. It will also need to take account of alternative proposals.

Back contamination risks of a Mars sample return
These concerns were originally raised by Carl Sagan in 1973 in his book the Cosmic Connection, and Carl Woese. More recently the concerns have been raised particularly by the International Committee Against Mars Sample Return, an advocacy group of scientists campaigning against an early MSR. .

These concerns inform both the official approach, and the scientists who are critical of it, and are of historical interest to all the parties in the debate.

Carl Woese, who first classified the Archaea, the third domain of life said in an interview:

Carl Sagan wrote in his book Cosmic Connection:

Existential risk potential for returned martian life
The potential of Martian life to create a biohazard on Earth was first raised by Carl Sagan in 1973 in his book "Cosmic Connection". The concern has been reviewed many times since then by experts in the field, with the same or similar conclusions. These are also the conclusions of the official NSF and ESF reports. According to these experts, it is an existential risk, though thought to be one of very low probability.

Sagan wrote:

The microbiologist Joshua Lederberg made a similar point about the impossibility of deciding the issue of biohazard potential.

Carl Sagan's recommendation for a vigorous program of Martian exobiology
Carl Sagan recommended that a "vigorous program of unmanned Martian exobiology and terrestrial epidemiology" should be undertaken first, before any Mars sample return.

He wrote this in the 1970s. However no such program was undertaken between Viking and Curiosity.

Curiosity is the first rover since Viking to directly search for biosignatures. This is just a beginning. Its "hand lens", though high resolution of 14.5 micrometers per pixel, can't observe endospores or other dormant states directly. A laboratory difraction limited optical microscope for study of cell life typically has a resolution of 0.2 micrometers per pixel. It can't dig far beneath the surface, and it's level of sterilization is not high enough under COSPAR guidelines to study habitats where life might occur in present day Mars.

There are other rovers planned for the future that will build on its results to continue a program of exobiology including more sensitive detection of biosignatures and signs of reproducing life on Mars.

Carl Sagan wrote in Cosmos :

National Research Council review of biohazard potential of returned samples
The National Research Council review was undertaken in 2009 (and previously in 1997) and published as their "Assessment of Planetary Protection Requirements for Mars Sample Return Missions". They carried out a review of the entire process of Mars Sample Return. The conclusion was that the potential hazard, though likely to be low, is not demonstrably zero, and that as a result any mars sample return should be treated as a potential biohazard until proved otherwise.

They reviewed the then current research on relevant subjects, to come to their conclusion.


 * Potential for habitable conditions on Mars. They concluded that research since the last report has enhanced the prospect that habitable environments were once widespread on Mars, and has improved understanding of the potential for modern habitable environments, and "enhanced the possibility that living samples could be present in samples returned from Mars".


 * Capability of micro-organisms to survive on Mars. To assess this, they reviewed recent research in microbial ecology in Chapter 3. They noted the discovery of new extremophiles in an increasing range of habitats, including highly acidic locations, conditions of extreme cold, of ephemeral habitability, and the capability of some micro-organisms to survive in dormant states for at least 250 million years. They also noted the discovery of novel single-species ecosystems such as the one inhabited solely by the chemoautotrophic Candidatus Desulforudis audaxviator. They noted the discovery of new organisms and ecological interactions, including viruses capable of limited independent viral growth outside a host cell, under acidic hyperthermophilic conditio. Their conclusion was that these researches highlighted the potential of micro-organisms adapted to live in the Martian environment.


 * Biohazard potential of any martian micro-organisms. They noted that extremophiles have not yet been shown to pose significant biological risk to humans. However in chapter 5, they note that there are comparative studies of extremophiles and of human pathogens "suggesting that evolutionary distances between nonpathogenic and pathogenic organisms can be quite small in some instances." As a result they concluded that the potential risks of biological epidemics can't be reduced to zero.


 * Would the sample include micro-organisms not already delivered to Earth on martian meteorites? To assess this, they estimated that around 5 meteorites a year probably impact Earth from Mars. So the transfer of sufficiently hardy life forms from Mars to Earth via meteorite seems plausible. However, they concluded that the passage in a sample container could preserve lifeforms that would not survive the passage on a meteorite.


 * Could martian lifeforms transferred to Earth in a meteorite have caused mass extinctions on Earth in the past? Their conclusion was that there is no evidence of this in the recent past but it could not be ruled out as a possibility in the more distant past.

Their overall conclusion was that "the potential for large-scale negative effects on Earth's inhabitants or environment by a returned martian life form appears to be low, but is not demonstrably zero". As with previous reports, they recommended that the sample be treated as a biohazard until proved otherwise.

Specific concerns detailed in the ESF Mars Sample Return backward contamination study and their risk mitigation
The proposal is to build a special new type of combined clean room, and biohazard containment facility to receive the samples. The sample return mission is designed to break the chain of contact with Mars for the exterior of the sample container.

The concerns considered by the ESA will be raised, as presented in the study, followed by their suggested methods to mitigate them.

Concerns with integrity of the sample container
The container could rupture if the parachute fails during the landing (rupture of a sample container has already occurred during the sample return of the Genesis capsule).

There is a low risk of an undetected failure to create a seal when the Mars sample is first enclosed in the container. Another risk is that "the sample magazine could be penetrated by a micrometeoroid during transit from Mars, thereby causing exterior contamination and release upon entry".

Risk mitigation: Reinforced sample container
The risk of rupture of the container is reduced by requiring that the capsule be capable of withstanding the shock of impact at terminal velocity.

The risks of undetected failure to create a seal when the Mars sample is first enclosed in the container, and of penetration by a micrometeoroid are reduced by use of methods to detect such leaks if they occur.

Concerns with the proposed biohazard facilities
First, the facility must also double as a clean room, to keep Earth micro-organisms away from the sample. This greatly adds to the complexity of the facility, and so to the risk of failure, since clean rooms and biohazard rooms have conflicting requirements (biohazard containment facilities are normally built with negative air pressure for instance, to keep organisms in, and clean rooms with positive air pressure to keep organisms out). It will be the first such facility ever to be built.

Also, biohazard facilities are designed to contain known hazards. It's a much harder problem to contain unknown hazards. A Mars sample could contain uncultivatable archaea, or ultramicrobacteria that can pass through a 0.1 µm filter. It might even contain Martian nanobacteria if such exist. A recent concern is that it could contain virus-types and genetransfer agents as small as 0.03 µm in size, especially if Mars life and Earth life share a common ancestor at some point. It might also contain forms of life that don't exist on Earth, possibly even based on novel life chemistry, which makes it hard to set an absolute lower size.

Risk mitigation: Analyze samples in Biosafety level 4 laboratories to a new design, with staff trained well in advance
NASA has proposed to build a Biosafety level 4 biohazard containment facility to a new design to protect the samples from Earth contamination and simultaneously protect against biohazard release. The sample return mission itself is designed to break the chain of contact with Mars for the exterior of the sample container

All the studies also recommend recommended that the facilities are built and staff trained well in advance of the actual mission. The current recommendation is that the facilities are completed and the staff trained at least two years before the sample is returned, and that the planning for the facility start at least a decade before sample return

Concerns about human error, crime, and natural accidents
Human error, or management decisions could compromise the safety precautions taken for safe sample return.

This happened several times during the Apollo era attempts at containing the lunar samples. In particular when the astronauts returned to Earth from Apollo 11, the hatch of the module was opened by divers, while it was still in the sea, permitting lunar dust to exit the module and enter the sea in breach of the previously established planetary protection protocol In the NASA proposals, the potential for human error is reduced by ensuring that the receiving facility is operational and the staff trained several years before the Mars samples are brought into Earth's environment.

Other risks include the possibility of accidents, natural disasters, or crime, leading to release of the materials, once the samples are on the Earth surface.

Risk mitigation: Institute proper safety training and management precautions
The risk of human error, or management decisions that compromise the safety precautions is reduced by training, redundancy, and making sure critical decisions are not made by tired astronauts.

Concerns about latency or incubation period
Carl Sagan first raised this concern:

The WHO Leprosy fact sheet gives the incubation period of leprosy, from first infection to onset of symptoms, as up to 20 years.

In the European Space Foundation report, incubation period is listed as the first of the list of unknowns that make it impossible to use standard models for the effects of a release and its consequences

Since all these factors are unknown, they concluded that "it is impossible to model the consequence of the potential release of a Mars organism".

Risk mitigation - detailed observations and rapid response
To mitigate this risk they "recommend that potential release scenarios (including undetected release) are clearly defined and investigated, and that response strategies are developed from these.

Recommendations for acceptable level of risk in the advance planning documents
In current advance planning for the Mars Sample Return facility on Earth it is recognised that the risks can't be reduced to zero.

One suggestion for an acceptable level of risk was recommended by the ESF-ESSC Study Group "Based on standards established and adopted at the national and international levels, the ESF-ESSC Study Group recommends that the probability of release of a potentially hazardous Mars particle shall be less than one in a million.".

About Lederberg's concern of a "zoonosis to beat all others" they say:

Assessment of an acceptable level of risk
There is much that is agreed on amongst all the parties concerned.


 * All agree on the scientific value of a MSR (provided scientifically interesting specimens can be returned to Earth)
 * All agree that the samples should be treated as biohazards until proved otherwise
 * All agree that the level of risk is probably very low
 * All those who discuss them agree that the recommendations and current NASA plans reduce the risk even further by a considerable amount.

The question at dispute is whether the combined risk is now so low it can be ignored?

To assess this, methods of legal and political decision making are required, and methods for assessing what are acceptable levels of risks on an ethical basis. The studies focus on the Precautionary Principle as a way to inform the decision making process.

Precautionary principle
By the Precautionary principle, a key principle in political decision making, and law:

Precautionary principle in the context of Mars Sample Return as assessed by the ESF-ESSC Study Group
The ESF-ESSC Study Group on MSR Planetary Protection Requirements studied various versions of the Precautionary Principle in the context of Mars Sample Return. This study found that the ones that were most relevant are:

They continue:

They therefore argue that the Best Available Technology Precautionary Principle should be used instead.

In this context a required level of risk needs to be determined to assess the technology used. They recommend a one in a million chance of release of a particle from Mars as an acceptable level of risk. Their reasoning is that the chance that the particle is hazardous is already low, and then by making the chance of release as low as one in a million, the combined risk is low enough to be acceptable.

Legal process of approval for Mars sample return
Race published a study of the legal processes required for approval. His conclusions were:

Under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (which did not exist in the Apollo era) a formal environment impact statement is likely to be required, and public hearings during which all the issues would be aired openly. This process is likely to take up to several years to complete.

The full range of worst accident scenarios, impact, and project alternatives would be played out in the public arena. Other agencies such as the Environment Protection Agency, Occupational Health and Safety Administration, etc, may also get involved in the decision making process. The laws on quarantine will also need to be clarified as applied to this situation.

Then apart from those domestic legal hurdles, there are numerous international regulations and treaties to be negotiated in the case of a Mars Sample Return, especially those relating to environmental protection and health. So the public of necessity has a significant role to play in the development of the policies governing Mars Sample Return.

Legal liability in case of damages
In the event of a release of the contents of the MSR capsule during return to Earth then the state responsible has unlimited liability in respect to any damages caused.

If the damages occur as a result of release after the capsule has returned to an Earth laboratory, the situation is less clear. The unlimited damage clause may still apply, or they might instead be responsible for an illegal act under general international law in violation of Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, which doesn't have the same provisions of unlimited liability.

Requirement for public debate
In addition to the legal requirement, it's been argued that there is a moral requirement for full and open public debate of the issues. The theologan Richard Randolph (in 2009) examined this in detail from a Christian perspective and came up with some recommendations, which are of general interest.

He then puts forward four criteria to ensure a full and open public debate. To summarize (he goes into more detail) the criteria are:


 * 1) The best practises of planetary protection must be followed.
 * 2) There should be opportunities for open comment from those concerned about back contamination. These comments should be taken seriously and NASA should publicly respond to those concerns.
 * 3) A committee should review the measures, and this committee should include experts in ecology, biology, chemistry, risk analysis and ethics. The ethicists should represent a diversity of philosophical and religious perspectives.
 * 4) The entire process should be transparent to the interested public.

Researchers who advocate no action
This section is included for completeness as required for the precautionary principle. However, there don't currently seem to be any notable advocates of this approach.

Researchers who advocate that a sample return to Earth should not e attempted until thoroughly studied first
A small minority of researchers are of the view that a sample return to Earth should not be attempted until the martian life and biohazard potential of the sample is thoroughly understood.

Historically, Carl Sagan and Carl Woese took this position.

In the present day, then Barry DiGregorio and Gilbert Levin are the main advocates. It is the stated view of the ICAMSR advocacy group lead by Barry DiGregorio, which includes some other members, who haven't published papers or been quoted in news stories on the subject.

Researchers who cite greater planetary protection issues as a motivation for in situ studes on Mars first
This section is for researchers who, though not critical of the prevailing MSR plans, present planterary protection advantages as points in favour of alternate approaches.

Craig Venter presents this as an advantage of his DNA sequencer on Mars approach. The telerobotics experts who advocate in situ studies by telepresence and telerobotics first, also do so partly because of the advantages of this approach for planetary protection.

The science potential of an early Mars sample return
To inform the debate on the MSR it is necessary to review the science potential, the motivation for the mission.

To quote from the ESF report

"Through the study of a sample, researchers could make great progress in understanding the history of Mars, its volatiles and climate, its geological and geophysical history, and gain new insights into astrobiology. A Mars sample return has also been deemed an essential precursor to any human exploration missions to Mars

Although some questions may be answered through in situ studies carried out by robotics on the Mars surface, returning a sample to Earth is desirable for several reasons:
 * Many experiments and their sample preparations will be too complex for an in situ robotic mission
 * Returning a sample allows for flexibility in dealing with the unknown and unexpected discoveries via new protocols, experiments and measurements
 * There are major limitations with regard to size and weight of instrumentation that can be flown
 * There is a significant communication delay to Mars, which impedes the ability to deal with emergencies
 * There is a much greater diversity in available instruments and an almost unlimited range of analytical techniques that can be applied on Earth
 * The ability to repeat experiments in multiple laboratories and confirm key results is available on Earth
 * Participation of entire analytical community is possible
 * There is the potential to propagate organisms if they are discovered

In addition to the above points, returning a Mars sample will bring enormous public excitement and engagement to space-related activities, along with pride and prestige to this accomplishment of mankind."

See also Mars_sample_return for the Mars sample return mission.

Issues with the science potential of an early MSR
This is for issues with the pure science potential, ignoring back contamination issues.

Issues to do with selection of samples of biological interest on mainly geological basis
Jeffrey Bada argues that we do not yet know enough to intelligently select samples for return. He is an advocate of a "Follow the Nitrogen strategy for in situ exploration".

He recommends that a MSR should be delayed until unambiguous biomarkers are identified in prospective Mars samples.

For return of biologically interesting samples, he requires ability to identify, in situ:

He also recommends:
 * Biomarkers and unequivocal biosignatures capable of distinguishing between biogenic and abiotic products, and stable over geological timescales. He mentions particularly the ability to detect chirality, and primary amine distribution as examples.
 * Samples suitable for preserving life, such as sulfates, haliites, clays and the polar layerd deposits, and with potential for preservation of organics without significant degradation over geological time periods.
 * Nitrogenous organic compounds
 * Trace amounts of organics
 * Any extraction methods used must preserve the target organic molecules with low degradation
 * Drilling to the greatest depth possible to allow for greatest chance of success for detecting organics and biosignatures.

Some of these concerns (but not all) have been addressed by the Final report of the MSR End-to End International Science Analysis Group in 2011. They stress the importance of observations to understand the geological context, They also plan to include the ESA Pasteur payload (developed for ExoMars) which includes some life detection instruments. It will for instance able for instance to detect many specific molecules likely to be associated with past or present life, with its Life Marker Chip. .

The focus of this report was on missions they considered practical, so, unlike Jeffrey Bada's suggestion, they don't require deep drilling, and don't require the MSR to be delayed until unambiguous biosignatures are found.

Issue of contamination of a returned sample by terrestrial DNA
Craig Venter (famous for sequencing the human genome) is in process of developing a miniaturized gene sequencer small enough to fit on a rover to Mars. His motivation is that current gene sequencers are now so sensitive, that if a single micro-organism from Earth landed on the sample returned from Mars, it would ruin the experiment to test for presence of martian DNA on the sample.

Craig Venter's view is that this is best done in situ on Mars.

This is another concern mentioned in the 2011 review of the Space Studies Board, however, they believe it can be surmounted by suitable decontamination procedures.

Advocacy of an early Mars sample return
In a 2011 survey of the community of active planetary scientists working on Mars :

In the summary of the final report of the Mars Program Planning Group in September 2012, two main pathways were presented with the group favouring the pathway leading to sample return as soon as possible.

Pathways A1 and A2:

Pathway A3

Alternatives to an early return of Mars samples to the Earth's surface
The precautionary principle requires full debate of all the possible alternative actions including no action. In the case of MSR there are many suggested alternatives to an early mission.

There are proposals to study the sample extensively on the surface of Mars. There are also proposals to return the sample to quarantine facilities in Mars orbit or to Earth orbit. Also return to quarantine facilities can be done straight away, or only after a thorough in situ study on the surface of Mars.

With all these approaches, Mars sample return would be expected eventually once it is possible to show with confidence that the chance of biohazard from the Mars sample is low enough to no longer be a matter of concern.

Vigorous study of the Mars surface before a sample return
There are instruments under development for future Mars missions that will enable preliminary study of samples with greater sensitivity than any instruments currently in use on the rovers.


 * NASA Marshall Space Flight Center is leading a research effort to develop a Miniaturized Variable Pressure Scanning Electron Microscope (MVP-SEM) for future lunar and martian missions.


 * Jonathan Rothberg, and J. Craig Venter, are separately developing solutions for sequencing alien DNA directly on the Martian surface itself. Venter additionally sees his proposal as a way to return Martian DNA to Earth while bypassign most of the back contamination issues, “We can rebuild the Martians in a P-4 spacesuit lab instead of having them land in the ocean.”


 * Levin is working on updated versions of the Labeled release instrument flown on Viking. For instance versions that rely on detecting chirality. This is of special interest because it can enable detection of life even if it is not based on standard life chemistry.


 * The Urey Mars Organic and Oxidant Detector instrument for detection of biosignatures due to be flown on Exomars in 2013. It is designed with much higher levels of sensitivity for biosignatures than any previous instruments

These proposed new instruments under development have the advantage over Mars sample return that you can analyse rocks in situ on Mars, and then choose new targets on the surface of Mars based on your findings. This approach could also involve study of the samples on the Mars surface via telepresence from Mars orbit, permitting rapid exploration and use of human cognition to take advantage of chance discoveries and feedback from the results obtained so far.

These proposed instruments would permit studies with a reasonable chance of detecting current life on Mars either through direct observation, or through activity that suggests life processes. If life signs are discovered, MSR would then be undertaken with extreme caution, after biohazard testing in situ on Mars first to the fullest extent possible.

Issues with in situ study as a way to reduce contamination risks
The Office of Planetary Protection have said that an in situ study, though useful, is not likely to significantly reduce uncertainty to the extent that planetary protection measures could be relaxed.

Vigorous study of the Mars surface instead of a sample return
This view was given in an interview of astrobiologist Dirk Schulze-Makuch for space.com

Another advocate of vigorous study on the surface in place of a MSR is Robert Zubrin, president of the Mars Society. He is of the opinion that the same objectives are better met using a vigorous program of robotic exploration using many rovers on the same model as Curiosity. In a panel session at the International Mars Society Convention in Pasadena on August 3 2012 he is reported as saying:

Then, writing an article himself in Space News in Dec. 3, 2012, he wrote :

Study via telepresence from Mars orbit, followed by return of the sample to Mars orbit
The use of telerobotics and telepresence on Mars was one of the subjects of the Exploration Telerobotics	Symposium| of researchers in telerobotics in industry and academia hosted at the NASA	Goddard	Space	Flight	Center in 2012. Their findings list many benefits of telepresence exploration of Mars.

They strongly recommended use of telerobotics in any proposed future mission to Mars orbit. They also recommended that sample return be made to Mars orbit rather than to Earth:

The report goes into the advantages of telerobotics for exploration of Mars in detail. Some of the main points raised are::

On the mobility benefits of telerobotics they write:

On the value for sample return to orbit:

Several types of suitable orbits for such a mission were discussed:

There have many previous proposals for human missions to Mars orbit to study the planet via telepresence and telerobotics, such as Zubrin's double Athena flyby, the Herro mission, and others, see Exploration of the surface from orbit, via telerobotics and telepresence

Return to the ISS or Earth orbital laboratory first
Gilbert Levin recommends a 10 step sequence for returning Martian samples to Earth This involves a series of tests for the micro-organisms in situ on Mars, including tests for biohazard potential to whatever extent is possible on Mars, before returning them to the ISS. Once in the ISS they need to be examined in secure biohazard facilities by volunteer scientists who are willing to give up their lives in the remote chance that a hazard is found that is of danger to life on Earth. Finally, if they pass all the tests, they can be returned to secure biohazard labs on Earth for further testing. Once on Earth then laboratories should be provided for researchers all in the same location, rather than send the samples to researchers in other locations for testing.

Issues with the use of quarantine periods in space to contain any biohazard
Many of these proposals recommend a quarantine period in a human occupied spacecraft in space first before the sample is returned to Earth. A 1997 study by the National Research Council found some issues which would need to be addressed if this is an essential feature of the back contamination containment protocol.

First, the study raised the issue that it would be hard to know for sure if any detected anomaly was the result of contamination. How, they say, could sufficient certainty be achieved to justify destroying the returning spacecraft and its crew?

Carl Sagan wrote about the same issue in his book The Cosmic Connection: An Extraterrestrial Perspective

In the case of the Lunar quarantine, then the guiding principles used by NASA at the time of Apollo did permit breach of quarantine in the case of danger to human life:

So the issue here is whether it is politically or humanly feasible to have a policy that puts preservation of quarantine at a higher priority than preservation of the life of individual astronauts. If not then the human quarantine approach does not give a total guarantee of containment of any issues found.

Another issue raised in the 1997 study is that infection might not be the only biohazard to contain, since a returning organism could cause long term changes in our environment that does not turn up during a quarantine period with humans.

Historical background
The idea of a Mars Sample Receiving laboratory was first studied in 1978. The idea then was for an orbiting quarantine facility called Anteus to receive the samples.