Mars Sample Receiving Facility and sample containment: Difference between revisions
Mars Sample Receiving Facility and sample containment (edit)
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The NRC and ESF findings on risks of [[Environmental degradation|environmental disruption]] are accepted by most participants in this debate (with the notable exception of Robert Zubrin<ref name=zubrin>Robert Zubrin "Contamination From Mars: No Threat", [http://www.planetary.org/explore/the-planetary-report/ The Planetary Report] July/Aug. 2000, P.4–5</ref><ref name=zubrin-interview>[http://astronomy.nmsu.edu/cwc/Teaching/SpaceCol/sts497i/Zubrin/transcript.txt transcription of a tele-conference interview with ROBERT ZUBRIN] conducted on March 30, 2001 by the class members of STS497 I, "Space Colonization"; Instructor: Dr. Chris Churchill</ref>). As a result, it is agreed by most researchers that a full and open public debate of the back contamination issues is needed at an international level.<!--(NASA and ESF surveys both say this as well as other sources e.g.) --><ref name=esf2012_PP-debate>{{cite report |title=Mars Sample Return backward contamination - strategic advice |publisher= European Science Foundation |year=2012 |chapter=5: "The Potential for Large-Scale Effects"|url=
Because of these concerns, there are proposals to build a Mars Sample Receiving Facility. This needs to be of a novel design, as it has to function both as a clean room and as a biohazard laboratory
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The view in the reports from the National Research Council<ref name=nrc2009>
{{cite report |title=Assessment of Planetary Protection Requirements for Mars Sample Return Missions |publisher=National Research Council |year=2009 |chapter=2: "The Potential for Past or Present Habitable Environments on Mars" | url=http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12576&page=22}}</ref> and the European Science Foundation,<ref name=esf2012_PP>[
{{cite report |title=Mars Sample Return: Issues and Recommendations (Planetary Protection Office Summary) |publisher=Planetary Protection Office |year=1997|url=http://planetaryprotection.nasa.gov/summary/msr|quote=''The potential for large-scale effects, either through pathogenesis or [[Environmental degradation|ecological disruption]], is extremely small. Thus, the risks associated with inadvertent introduction of exogenous microbes into the terrestrial environment are judged to be low. However, any assessment of the potential for harmful effects involves many uncertainties, and the risk is not zero. ... The SSB task group strongly endorses NASA’s Exobiological Strategy for Mars Exploration (NASA, 1995). Such an exploration program, while likely to greatly enhance our understanding of Mars and its potential for harboring life, nonetheless is not likely to significantly reduce uncertainty as to whether any particular returned sample might include a viable exogenous biological entity-at least not to the extent that planetary protection measures could be relaxed.''}}</ref> is as follows:
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=== ESF update on biohazard risks of MSR ===
The ESF report<ref name=esf2012_PP/> accepts the general conclusions of the NRC report, but went beyond them in several areas. In particular they made a more detailed assessment of size limits of micro-organisms. Before this study, the accepted size limits <ref name=esf2010_3size>[
The 2010 ESF study observed that the Mars sample could contain [[Archaea#Species|uncultivatable archaea]], or [[ultramicrobacteria]]. It might contain Martian [[Nanobacterium|nanobacteria]] 0.1 µm if such exist. A recent concern is that it could contain virus-types and genetransfer agents as small as 0.03 µm in size, especially if Mars life and Earth life share a common ancestor at some point.<ref name=esf2010_LAWKI>[
For the nanobacteria, they accepted recent research that show these 0.1 µm sized cell like objects are mineral deposits, so ruled them out. They discussed [[ultramicrobacteria]] and concluded that the smallest free-living self-replicating microorganisms observed are in the range of 0.12–0.2 µm.
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==Risk Mitigation for back contamination==
[[NASA]] has addressed back contamination concerns with a proposal to build a special biohazard containment facility to receive the samples, and with a sample return mission designed to break the chain of contact with Mars for the exterior of the sample container<ref name=esf2010_PP>[
In the European Science Foundation study, these risks were studied in more detail and recommendations made to reduce them to levels considered acceptable.
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To deal with issues of the novelty of the facilities and of human error, the studies recommended that the receiving facility is operational and the staff trained several years before the Mars samples are brought into Earth's environment. The 2008 report of the IMARS working group report detailed a total of twelve years from initial planning to lander launch.<ref name=imars>[http://mepag.nasa.gov/reports/iMARS_FinalReport.pdf Preliminary Planning for an International Mars Sample Return Mission] Report of the International Mars Architecture for the Return of Samples (iMARS) Working Group, June 1, 2008</ref> Three architectural firms were approached who provided preliminary plans, the FLAD, IDC and LAS plans, the last of these, the LAS has a fully robotic work force to handle the samples.<ref>Jeremy Hsu [http://www.astrobio.net/exclusive/3329/keeping-mars-contained Keeping Mars Contained] Astrobiology Magazine 12/03/09</ref><ref>Beaty DW, Allen CC, Bass DS, Buxbaum KL, Campbell JK, Lindstrom DJ, Miller SL, Papanastassiou DA. [http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19845446?report=abstract Planning considerations for a Mars Sample Receiving Facility: summary and interpretation of three design studies.] Astrobiology. 2009 Oct;9(8):745-58. doi: 10.1089/ast.2009.0339.</ref><ref>[http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=5563&page=31 Mars Sample Return: Issues and Recommendations](1997)] Task Group on Issues in Sample Return, National Research Council (page 31)</ref>
They were not asked to consider human factors and so do not report on ways to mitigate these, except to suggest that care must be taken to minimize human interaction with the sample.<ref name=esf2012_PP-human-factors>{{cite report |title=Mars Sample Return backward contamination - strategic advice |publisher= European Science Foundation |year=2012 |chapter=4.7 Potential verification methods"|url=
===Concerns about incubation period===
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The WHO Leprosy fact sheet<ref>[http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs101/en/ Leprosy Fact Sheet] World Health Organization</ref> gives the [[incubation period]] of [[leprosy]], from first infection to onset of symptoms, as up to 20 years.
In the European Science Foundation report, incubation period is listed as the first of the list of unknowns that make it impossible to use standard models for the effects of a release and its consequences <ref name=esf2012_PP-precautionary>[
====Risk mitigation for incubation period====
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They recommend that potential release scenarios (including undetected release) are clearly defined and investigated, and response strategies developed for them.
They considered it critical that such containment strategies are implemented as soon as possible at the local level, and that they should include rapid detection of anomalies, effective warning procedures, and analysis, resistance and mitigation procedures.<ref name=esf2012_PP-being-prepared>{{cite report |title=Mars Sample Return backward contamination - strategic advice |publisher= European Science Foundation |year=2012 |chapter=5: "The Potential for Large-Scale Effects - 5.4 Being prepared"|url=
====Views of the 2002 COMPLEX study of lessons to be learnt from the Apollo quarantine====
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