Planetary protection for a Mars sample return: Difference between revisions

Other risks mentioned in these studies, and by the Planetary Protection Office include the possibility of human error, accidents, natural disasters, security breach, actions by terrorist or 'activist' groups or crime, leading to release of the materials, once the samples are on the Earth surface.<ref name=esf2012_PP-crime-etc>{{cite report |title=A Draft Test Protocol for Detecting possible biohazards in martian samples returned to Earth|publisher=NASA |year=2002 |quote="ProceduresQuestions forabout handlingthe a breachadequacy of the SRF due to differentmaintain causesthe (e.g.new leak,life disasterform must also be addressed, securityincluding breachthe etc)possible shouldneed beto consideredadd inequipment, hechange developmentoperations, ofreview emergency plans, foror handlingupgrade athe breachfacilities because of what has been found. Concerns about security should also be reconsidered, epeciallyespecially in view of the potential disruptive activities of any terrorist or 'radical' groups that may be opposed to sample return. (page 10193) .... The breach could be the result of an accident or a crime - as a result of activity either outside or within containment (page 10496)"|url=httphttps://planetaryprotectiondiscovery.larc.nasa.gov/file_download/10pdf_files/MSRDraftTestProtocol.pdf}}</ref>

To deal with issues of the novelty of the facilities and of human error, the studies recommended that the receiving facility is operational and the staff trained several years before the Mars samples are brought into Earth's environment. The 2008 report of the IMARS working group report detailed a total of twelve years from initial planning to lander launch.<ref name=imars>[https://web.archive.org/web/20130124081409/http://mepag.nasa.gov/reports/iMARS_FinalReport.pdf Preliminary Planning for an International Mars Sample Return Mission] Report of the International Mars Architecture for the Return of Samples (iMARS) Working Group, June 1, 2008</ref> Three architectural firms were approached who provided preliminary plans, the FLAD, IDC and LAS plans, the last of these, the LAS has a fully robotic work force to handle the samples.<ref>Jeremy Hsu [http://www.astrobio.net/exclusive/3329/keeping-mars-contained Keeping Mars Contained] Astrobiology Magazine 12/03/09</ref><ref>Beaty DW, Allen CC, Bass DS, Buxbaum KL, Campbell JK, Lindstrom DJ, Miller SL, Papanastassiou DA. [http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19845446?report=abstract Planning considerations for a Mars Sample Receiving Facility: summary and interpretation of three design studies.] Astrobiology. 2009 Oct;9(8):745-58. doi: 10.1089/ast.2009.0339.</ref><ref>[http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=5563&page=31 Mars Sample Return: Issues and Recommendations](1997)] Task Group on Issues in Sample Return, National Research Council (page 31)</ref>

They were not asked to consider human factors and so do not report on ways to mitigate these, except to suggest that care must be taken to minimize human interaction with the sample.<ref name=esf2012_PP-human-factors>{{cite report |title=Mars Sample Return backward contamination - strategic advice |publisher= European Science Foundation |year=2012 |chapter=4.7 Potential verification methods"|urlhttpsurl=https://science.nasa.gov/science-pink/s3fs-public/atoms/files/ESF_Mars_Sample_Return_backward_contamination_study.pdf |quote=''While the Study Group was not tasked with considering human factors, it has to be highlighted that the use of human handling in this process and the transport itself entails the risk of human error and the potential for accidental release. For this reason, care must be taken to minimise human interaction with the sample and to provide adequate protection via transport containment to guard against an accident during transport to the curation facility.''}}</ref>